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Society, Social Policy and
the Ideology of Reaganisni
JAMB'S MIDGLEY
Louisiana Stale University
7he comnplex historical an(e irl'oogical thmctes which forinerl Me asis for
Reaanisin in tle 1980s ar' fiasted on economic inliidaali.m, Iradition-
alisin and atlhorilarian pi'jnlism. By Creating al idhloirat .iirnalion
ihlih appeal/cd to a ifide coi situc-tic, righl-roirg ac'iz'ists sougilt to
ieo{'rse the centrist nomsensuts liberalism (If tie New Deal. "''se ideas
also informed tile Reagan admiinistration's social policies ald, a/thon1g/i1
not implmentd as intende, /ham, had a major iiniarl ot fHit' American
wel0fare state.
When Ronald Reaglan entered the White How ise in January,
1981, many believed thal tlw tradition of centrist, consensus
liberalism which had governed political affairs in the United
Slates for decades would be dismantled. In his election cam-
paign, Reagan dramaticalixy confronted the liberal tradition, and
cautight the mood of a disillusioned electorate anenable to new,
simple, homespun messages. Once in office, his administra-
lion implemented radical right wing policies with ruthless re-
solve. Although the Reaganite agenda was not implemented
as intended, it had a major impact on the nation legacy of
consensus politics.
Many political commentators contend that Ronald Reagan
cane to power as a result of an orchestrated reaction agiainst
establishment centrist politics (Blumenthal, 1986; Kymlicka and
Matthews, 1988; Himmelstein, 1990). They view the Reagan vic-
tory not as a discreet historical event, but as the culmination of
a long and, some would argue, conspiratorial period of strug-
gle in which radical right wing activists sought to rtverse the
dominance of centrist liberalism and its pervasive influence
on economic, cultural, judiVial and social affairs. Ironically, the
struggle against liberalism originated at the time that Reagan's
erstwhile hero, Franklin Roosevelt established Ihe New Deal
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and at a time when Reagan, as he himself admits, was a "near
hopeless hemophiliac liberal" (Reagan and Hubler, 1981, p. 18).
Although Ronald Reagan's success may be attributed to
many factors, an examination of the ideology of Reaganism is re-
quired if the the Reagan era is to be properly understood. At the
heart of the Reagan phenomenon is a skillful blending of ideo-
logical themes that catered.to a broad spectrum of the electorate
and attracted support from very different constituencies. Eco-
nomic libertarianism, cultural traditionalism and authoritarian
populism were effectively coalesced to appeal simultaneously to
urbane Wall Street stockbrokers, fanatical fundamentalist Chris-
tians, mainstream middle class suburban Americans and rural
Southerners. As an ideology, Reaganism offered a credible al-
ternative to the apparently depleted traditions of centrist lib-
eralism. It also successfully challenged the dominant welfarist
ideology of the New Deal.
Reaganism's Historical Origins
As an activist program of social and economic reform, Roo-
sevelt's New Deal lasted for a relatively short time. But, seen in
terms of its broader, effects, the New Deal exerted a profound
influence that lasted for decades. Following earlier and more
dramatic changes in Europe, the New Deal legitimized the in-
stitutionalization of statism and welfarism in American society.
Although the New Deal failed to create a highly centralized and
comprehensive European style welfare state, it secured support
for the notion that the state is a central social institution respon-
sible not only for defense and law and order but for economic
planning and the promotion of growth, the ehhancement of wel-
fare and the regulation of many facets of everyday life.
The New Deal also brought about a major political realign-
ment in American politics. Under Roosevelt, the Democrats
ceased to be a predominantly Southern party drawing support
from the cities and from urban workers, ethnic voters and a
large section of the middle class. Re-emerging as a force for
progressive liberalism, the Democratic party also succeeded in
building a coalition between liberal politicians, the labor move-
ment, intellectuals, professionals and the business sector.
Ideology of Reaganism
Above all, the New Deal institutionalized a culture of prag-
matic, centrist liberalism that many believed heralded the end
of ideology. Unlike most of Europe, where ideological differ-
ences between the major political parties were unambiguous
and readily identified with class and other sectional interests,
the New Deal facilitated a convergence in American politics in
which the two major parties adopted similar centrist policies
and forged a consensus around major economic, social and po-
litical issues. This convergence was reflected in the policies of
successive Republican and Democratic administrations.
These developments led many analysts to conclude that the
end of ideology had been definitively reached. In a much cited
work, political scientist Daniel Bell claimed that ideology, had
"come to a dead end" (1962, p. 393). In his attempt to formulate
a generalized sociological construction of the social world, the
celebrated.Harvard sociologist Talcott Parsons (1951) conceived
of American society as a well-regulated, homeostatic system
characterized by consensus rather than conflict. Most analysts
agreed and also took the view that radical movements on both
the right and left were aberrations in the smooth functioning
new world of mainstream consensus liberalism. For example,
Richard Hofstadter (1963) argued that organizations such as
the John Birch Society, Christian Crusade and supporters of
McCarthyism were little more than disaffected groups on the
social fringe struggling to deal with their status anxieties.
Those on the radical right took a different view. For them,
consensus politics was not a mainstream phenomenon but the
product of an insidious, left-leaning liberal establishment that
had successfully penetrated both political parties to exert a pow-
erful hegemonic control over the nation. Determined to chal-
lenge its dominance, the radical right schemed, organized and
planned in the hope of forming an effective counterestablish-
ment capable of fermenting a counterrevolution to the New Deal
and its allegedly perfidious influence (Blumenthal, 1986).
Some analysts place the origins of the radical right's coun-
terrevolution in the mid-1960s, after the failure of Barry Gold-
water's presidential campaign. But its roots are much older.
Indeed, the lineage of right wing struggle against the centrist
legacy of the New Deal is a long one. It can be traced back to
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Hoover himself, the embittered former president whose wealth
and name supported a policy research institute which has vigor-
ously propagated radical right ideas, and served as a a model for
numerous other right wing think tanks. It can be traced to the
eccentric activities of Albert Jay Nock and his prophetic faith in
a 'Remnant' that would one-day rise up and overthrow the New
Deal and its attendant evils. It can be traced back to the publica-
tions of works such as The Road to Setfdom in 1944, and The Con-
servative Mind in 1953 by then obscure authors Friedrich Hayek
and Russell Kirk, and the founding of National Review in 1955.
The Reagan victory can also be traced to the failures of the
radical right to exercise real political power during the liberal
post-New Deal years, including those when Republican presi-
dents were in office. Despite its fanatical vigor, the McCarthy
campaign of the 1950s fizzled and while considerable resources
were mobilized, the attempt to send a right wing candidate
to the White I-louse in 1964 ended in embarrassing defeat. Al-
though Richard Nixon had appropriate credentials, he betrayed
the radical right because of his apparent accommodation with
communism, his moderate stance on many domestic issues and,
of course, the Watergate fiasco. His selection of Gerald Ford
as his successor, and Ford's subsequent nomination of Nelson
Rockefeller as Vice President dismayed right wing radicals. As
Richard Viguerie, one of their most dedicated activists reports,
"For many of us, it was the last straw" (1980, p. 28). While Ford
represented the comprising, consensus politics that had domi-
nated Washington's political establishment fur decades, Rocke-
feller's Eastern establishment background and his opposition to
Goldwater in 1964 personified everything that was wrong with
mainstream Republicanism. As Viguerie notes, the radical right
did not lack money or enthusiasm, nor did it lack ideas and ide-
ologues; what it lacked was a leader who could appeal to the
electorate and convince citizens of the need for radical change.
The leader who emerged to fill this vacuum was Ronald Reagan.
Reagan dates his own conversion from New Deal liberalism
to his early days in Hollywood when he came to believe that
the film industry was riddled with communists whom liber-
als refused to oppose. By the 1960s, lie had not only become a
dedicated anticommunist but an opponent of the very policies
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Roosevelt had introduced. In 1962, lie formally changed party
affiliation to join the Republicans and in 1964 he campaigned
aggressively for Goldwater. Polonberg (1988) points out that
Reagan's speeches at this time were characterized by a viru-
lent antiwelfarism 'which castigated the welfare state as "the
most dangerous enemy known to man," and ridiculed unem-
ployment insurance as a state sponsored "prepaid vacation plan
for freeloaders."
During the 1970s, radical right wing forces gathered around
Reagan. Disillusioned with traditional republican leaders, they
had considerable resources at their command. Far right busi-
ness tycoons such as William Simon and Charles Wick poured
millions of dollars into the campaign. The candidate also had
a clearly articulated ideology with specific programs for action.
Beginning with William Buckley and the creation of National
Review in the 1950s, the intellectual base for radical right wing
ideas had been carefully articulated. With the help of right wing
think tanks, and numerous journals and magazines, these ideas
were presented as a plausible program for action. Effective coali-
tions were built with electorally significant movements such
as the fundamentalist Christian right, and with the support of
highly organized campaigners such as Viguerie and Weyrich,
the stage was set for a Reagan victory in '1980. In addition,
salutary lessons had been learned from the campaign for the
Republican nomination in 1976, 1
Jimmy Carter was an ideal opponent. Despite his effective
use of populist electoral strategies in the 1976 presidential race,
Carter was caught in a web of circumstances that favored the
Reaganite strategy. The economic difficulties of the 1970s were
presented as the result of liberal mismanagement, heavy taxes
and an overgenerous welfare system and not as a consequence
of global difficulties stemming from the rapid oil price increases
or from deindustrustrialization and other international eco-
nomic events. An increase in permissiveness, moral relativism
and individual choice which had characterized the 1960s was
depicted not as the consequence of inevitable social change
in an advanced industrial society but of the failure of liber-
alism to maintain social order and support traditional values.
The foreign policy debacle of Iran was successfully portrayed
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as the result of liberal weakness and placatory concessions to
the nation's enemies. Exploiting these problems, Ronald Rea-
gan successfully caricatured Carter and his troubles as a man-
ifestation of failed liberalism and he victoriously secured the
White House.
The Ideology of Reaganism
If events in the 1970s served tie radical right's campaign
efforts, the message they presented is equally important in un-
derstanding Ronald Reagan's electoral appeal. Juxtaposing their
new, easily comprehensible and aggressive ideology against tile
teachings of mainstream liberalism, the radical right secured
widespread voter support. While notions of self-doubt, a recog-
nition of the complexity of issues, and the toleration of diverse
views havc long been central ingredients in traditional liberal
thought, these became electoral liabilities. In the context of se-
rious economic difficulties, increased moral relativism and de-
clining international influence, the ideals of liberalism appeared
ineffectual and incapable of dealing with the problems of the
time. Reaganism, on the other hand, offered simple, common-
sensical and vigorous solutions. Reagan's aggressive posturing
on international issues, his dogmatic assertion that tax cuts and
welfare reductions would resolve economic problems, and his
promise of better times were effectively packaged.
However, behind the media messages lay a serious and
deadly effective constellation of ideological beliefs which had
been successfully forged into a unitary system through years of
intellectual experimentation. These were cleverly synthesized to
comprise tile new ideology of Reaganism which had consider-
able appeal. At least three themes can be identified within this
complex ideology: these are economic individualism, cultural
traditionalism and authoritarian populism.
Tie Role of Economic Individualism
The New Deal legitimized state intervention in economic,
social, cultural and other spheres of life and exemplified a con-
certed attempt at economic regulation and planning. Using Key-
nesian techniques, post-New Deal administrations intervened
directly to manage the economy. The prosperity of the 1950s
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and 1960s suggested, that interventionism was not only desir-
able but effective. A few dissenter, such as Iayek and the mi-
nority free-market wing of the Department of Economics at the
University of Chicago (where-Milton Friedman's ideas were cul-
tivated) were relegated to the fringe of the discipline.
Keynesian doctrine first appeared to be in serious difficulty
in the early 1970s when the phenomenon of stagflation be-
came endemic. Recessionary tendencies had previously been
amenable to demand stimulus, but now recession and soar-
ing inflation combined to present a new and apparently insol-
uble problem. Faced with stagnation, escalating energy costs,
increasing trade union activism, falling productivity, de-indus-
trialization and capital flight, Keynesianism seemed impotent.
Suddenly, the advocacy of radical economic individualism
seemed plausible.
Friedman was the first of the radical economic individual-
ists to gain national attentidn. His Capitalism and Freedomn (1962)
was written in lay language and despite claims to positivist ob-
jectivity, it offered an attractive ideological formulation which
was highly compatible with American traditional culture. Fried-
man worked closely with Goldwater to develop a radical right
alternative economic strategy and by the mid-1970s, his ideas
had formed the basis for various economic individualist theses.
"The most important of these was Arthur Laffer's supply-side
economic theory which contended that large reductions in taxa-
tion would stimulate economic activity and, as a result of higher
output, generate higher fiscal revenues. Supply-side teachings
caught Reagan's imagination and provided formal justification
for his instinctive desire to slash taxes. And it was in the name.
of supply-side economics that massive budgetary cuts and tax
reductions were introduced early in the president's first term.
The ideological bases for monetarism, supply-side econom-
ics and similar formulations are grounded in classical individ-
ualist thought and, as such, offer little that is new. They have,
however, been implemented with considerable effect. In the
United States, supply-side ideas resulted in the massive
de-regulation of broadcasting, communications and the energy
sector. They also resulted in substantial budgetary reductions
particularly to state welfare programs. And, as Phillips (1990)
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reports, they produced a substantive re-distribution of income
in favor of the wealthy.
However, the promised results of the aggressive adoption of
economic individualism have not been realized. Tax and bud-
getary reductions have not spurred prosperity but have resulted
in a mammoth deficit and in the increased immiserization of
the poor. Contrary to the belief that de-regulation would facil-
itate greater competition, monopolization continues apace. Pri-
vatization of state human service programs has not magically
solved pressing social problems but merely provided new av-
enues for entrepreneur'ship. Also, the radical right's dogmatic
adherence to economic individualism has not reduced state
power. Instead, the Reagan years have shown that the very con-
siderable resources of the state can be used to promote the sec-
tional interests of the powerful rather than the general welfare
of the population.
7ie Inportance of Traditionalism
A second theme in the ideology of Reaganism is cultural
traditionalism. Conservatives have always valved tradition and
order and this impi1se was successfully inlegrated into the Rea-
ganite campaign. A prinary stimulus for the radical right's ob-
session with order was the counterculture of the 1960s. The rise
of campus and other revolutionary groups, an increase in la-
bor activism, the urban riots, the popularization of narcotics,
increased sexual freedom and mass opposition to the Vietnam
War appalled conservatives and appearcd to threaten the fun-
clamental values of American society. While the Johnson ad-
ministration was hardly subversive of established authority, its
liberalism bore the brunt of the traditionalist backlash.
Transitionalist reaction to permissiveness and diversity came
from several quarters. As may be expected, it galvanized funda-
mentalist opinion which eagerly supported Reagan. The prom-
ise of order also had considerable appeal to 'middle Americans'
in the suburbs and rural communities who viewed campus id-
iosyncrasies, urban violence and loud rock music alike with
increasing alarm. But of equal significance was the reaction of a
group of intellectuals, loosely known as the Neo-conservatives,
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who provided the theoretical basis for tie traditionalist conpo-
nent of Reaganite ideology.
Although Irving Kristol and Norman Podhoretz are most
frequently identified as the movement's leaders, numerous
other writers' and academicians including Robert Nisbet(,
Michael Novak, George Gilder, Peter Berger and others have
been associated with Neo-conservative thinking and with their
leading journals Comentary and Public Interest.
Central to the Neo-conservative's critique lies an abhorrence
of liberalism's acceptance of modernity and permissiveness.
Kristol regards the rampant individualism of the modern age
as a primary cause of societal ills. By placing individual rights
above those of duty and responsibility to the wider commu-
nity, the values of society are dangerously weakened with ihe
result that nihilism replaces order and undermines organically
binding institutions. This has resulted in an increase in crime,
violence, and other social problems and in the demise of the
traditional family with a concomitant increase in welfare de-
pendency. Instead of counteracting these trends by seeking to
impose traditional values, the modern state has licensed per-
missiveness, and thus undermined vital social institutions.
These ideas have been articulated with particular reference
to welfare and family policy in the writings of George Gilder
(1973, 1980) and Charles Murray (1984), both of whom claimed
that the liberal New ]Deal and its welfare programs had under-
mined the traditional family and its responsibility to care for
its members. The rise of feminism had further exacerbated the
problem, creating fatherless, rootless families unable to utilize
their own resources to contribute to the good of the commu-
nity. Similarly, the increase in permissiveness had encouraged
illegitimacy and welfare dependency.
The Neo-conservative's rejection of moral relativism and
their emphasis on the revitalization of traditional values had
electoral resonance. The Reagan campaign aligned closely with
the fundamentalist Christian right and although Carter had pre-
viously claimed to be a born again Christian, his support of
liberal causes such as abortion caused massive defections of his
fundamentalist followers. Concentrating their electoral effort on
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those constituencies that were most amenable to traditionalist
appeal, the Reaganites scored notable gains.
There were some attempts to translate, traditionalist ideas
into legislative action during the Reagan years. Although the
introduction of the Family Life Support Bill in the administra-
tion's early years was a major traditionalist legislative initiative,
it failed miserably. If enacted, it would have restricted abortion,
prohibited legal aid in cases of divorce, abortion and homosex.
ual rights, required an emphasis on traditional American family
values in the classroom and prohibited teaching materials that
"denigrates the role of women as it has been traditionally un-
derstood" (Jorstad, 1987, p. 18). Nevertheless, it appears that the
traditionalist struggle against abortion, pornography and acces-
sible contraception, which is today being waged in the streets
by highly committed groups of right-wing and fundamentalist
activists, is making some headway.
The Appeal of A Ohoritarian Populism
American politics has relied extensively on populist ideo-
logical strategies and Ronald Reagan's use of these techniques
were not, therefore, novel. Indeed, Jimmy Carter had shown
in the 1976 campaign that he was a dexterous manipulator of
populist sentiment. But Reagan played the populist card withgreater effectiveness not only ii terms of electoral technique but
in terms of ideological cotitent.
Analysts of populism (Wiles, 1969; Canovan, 1981) have
contended that populism has greatest appeal in times of so-
cial stress. Effective populist political strategies seek to exploit
feelings of discontent by juxtaposing the interests of ordinary
people against those of the cause of discontent. During the Rea-
gan campaign, the liberal establishment and its big government,
were effectively presented as the cause of social ills.
A major focus of the Reaganite populist campaign was the
economic difficulties of the time. While most politicians rec-
ognized the complexities of the situation and supported ef-
forts to formulate intricate solutions, ordinary people became
increasingly perplexed. The presentation of a simple diagnosis
of the situation, and of straightforward remedies in terms that
were readily comprehensible was highly successful. Instead of
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attributing economic woes to complex international and do-
mestic developments, the Reaganites blamed indifference, high
taxes, welfare dependency and, trade union obstructiveness for
the country's economic difficulties. Since this confirmed popular
beliefs, many voters instinctively identified with the candidate
and his simple, homespun explanations.
The Reagan campaign skillfully injected another element
into the- populist agenda-strong, authoritarian leadership.
Casting Jimmy Carter's entanglement in the Iran crisis as weak
and indecisive, Reagan projected a belligerent Rambo-like ap-
proach to foreign policy and particularly towards communism.
Here was a leader who would not placate the enemy but as-.
sert American superiority. The "evil empire" would be resisted
with a massive defense build-up and with technologically su-
perior new weaponry that would secure military supremacy.
Even though the president's television appearances suggested
a faltering approach, an indecisiveness when answering. ques-
tions, and a preference for jelly beans rather than war, the strong
leader image was effectively cultivated and it had huge appeal.
Other elements which formed the basis of Reaganite author-
itarian populism include antiwelfarism, traditionalism, racism,
anticommunism and patriotism. The Reaganite attack on wel-
fare, moral relativism, the alleged excesses of affirmative action,
and the decline in national pride effectively exploited subter-
ranean authoritarian sentiments, and provided comfort to those
who felt that their grievances were being ignored by an indiffer-
ent political establishment. The appeal to populism also had the
effect of facilitating social cohesion. The administration's unre-
lenting attacks on the Soviet Union strengthened the image of
a common enemy and fostered cohesion. By exploiting populist
sentiments, Reagan deftly developed Nixon's earlier notion of
the silent majority. Ordinary people who opposed welfarism,
communism, permissiveness and the excesses of liberalism were
not only in the majority, but the authentic upholders of true
American values and beliefs. In so doing, Reagan not only in-
creased his electoral support but enhanced emotive feelings of
nationhood and fostered an organic identification between the
people and their national leader. Since this reduced the feelings
of alienation and discontent which characterized the late 1970s,
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the claim that the Reagan had restored national pride and self-
confidence has some validity.
Social Policy and the Ideology of Reaganism
The themes which comprised the ideology of Reaganism
have found expression in the administration's various programs
and legislative enactments in social policy. Economic individ-
ualist ideas pervaded the substantial budgetary cuts imposed
on the human services during the president's first term. Tradi-
tionalist ideas were expressed in the way administrative proce-
dures in the human services were tightened to the detriment of
needy women with children. The Family Support Act of 1988
gave expression to both economic individualist ideas and to an
underlying traditionalist antagonism to single parent families
dependent on state support. By curtailing human service pro-
grams, the Reagan administration effectively affirmed dearly
held beliefs about the importance of work, sobriety and success
in American society.
In their campaign, the Reaganites consistently emphasized
antiwelfarist themes, effectively evokirig the familiar image of
the Workshy, freeloading welfare recipient who is luxuriously
supported by the state at great cost to the taxpayer. Although
antiwelfarist sentiments have long had a prominent place in
the folk demonology of American popular culture, Reagan ef-
fectively linked economic troubles and the perceived decline in
moral standards to the Johnson administration's social policy
initiatives. Drawing on the arguments of right wing think tanks
as articulated by Murray (1984), he effectively communicated
the idea that American social policy over previous decades had
harmed rather than helped the poor. The alternative, he argued,
was a radical disengagement of the state from social welfare.
Unlike his conservative predecessors who sought to curtail wel-
fare, Reagan argued for abolition.
Although the Reagan administration did not meet this objec-.
five, it certainly tried. In its first two years of office, it imposed
substantial budgetary cuts on social expenditures and by 1984,
as Bawden and Palmer (1984) reported, the administration had
succeeded in cutting .deeply into major social programs. Unem-
ployment insurance had been reduced by 17.4%, child nutrition
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programs by 28%, food stamp expenditures by 13.8%, and the
Community Service Block Grant program by 37.1%. Aid to Fam-
ilies with Dependent Children, a primary target of the admin-
istration's antiwelfarism, suffered by a cut of 14.3%. These cuts
were accompanied by reductions in benefits levels and by the
imposition of stringent eligibility requirements which excluded
many needy people from receiving any form of aid. Moffit and
Wold (1987) have shown that the cuts in the 1981 Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act alone terminated as many as 35% of
Working AFDC recipients.
The attack on the human services was accompanied by sub-
stantial tax cuts which were intended not only to implement
supply-side doctrine but as David Stockman (1986), the ad-
ministration's budget director cynically admitted, to starve
Congress of the revenues needed to restore the cuts and to
introduce new programs. Tax cuts benefited the wealthy and
the corporations. Citing just one example of the massive subsi-
dies directed at the commercial and industrial sectors, Harrison
and Bluestone- (1988) show that changes to the rules governing
the depreciation of equipment resulted in taxpayers subsidiz-
ing the full costs of business capital outlays. The antiwelfarist
developments of the 1980s were consonant with Reaganite ide-
ology whi ch had consistently condemned state involvement in
welfare. Instead, self-reliance, the family, the voluntary sector
and the for-profit commercial human service sector would re-
place the state as primary providor. As Carlson and Hoplins
(1981), two Reagan White House aids explained, state provision
would be permitted only for those who could not work and had
absolutely no other means of support.
Two factors- impeded the realization of the radical right's
antiwelfarist goals. First, Congress resisted the cuts and with
the return of a Democratic majority, the Reaganite agenda was
thwarted. Second, the cuts and the recession combined to gen-
erate a highly visible poverty problem. As Friedmanite mon-
etarist prescriptions were introduced by the Federal Reserve,
and as interest rates soared, GNP fell by 4.9% in the fourth
quarter of 1981 alone and by another 3.2% during 1982. By the
end of 1982, 4.5 million more people were unemployed than
in 1979 (Harrison and Bluestone, 1988). Homelessness became
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a serious problem and the incidence of infant mortality and
hunger increased. Faced with these dramatic consequences, the
administration reluctantly began to soften its position. Monetary
policy was relaxed and budgetary appropriations for military
and other items were increased.
But while the welfare state survived, the Reaganites suc-
ceeded in severely undermining its legitimacy and budgetary
base. It is perhaps ironic that the administration's artificially
induced recession and its massive budget cuts impeded its pri-
mary goal of abolishing the- welfare state. Had the-recession not
been so severe, and produced negative reactions, the adminis-
tration may not have reVersed its position, And, had the budget
cuts not been so ruthlessly and carelessly implemented, the vol-
untary sector might well have emerged as a credible alternative
to state provision. Instead, as Salamon (1984) noted, budget ap-
propriations for the voluntary sector suffered major cuts and
this effectively hindered its ability to replace state services.
The Reagan Legacy: Durable or Transient?
The Reagan administration's coming to office in 1981 her-
alded a major change in American politics. The radical ideology
of Reaganism coupled with an aggressive political style sug-
gested that Reaganite resolve would engender enduring eco-
nomic, political and social changes. Now, ten years later, it is
possible to make some initial assessment about the significance
of th Reagan years.
As has been suggested earlier, the Reagan administration
did not achieve all its objectives. The welfare state remains more
or less intact even though its eff(ctiveness has been impeded.
Although somewhat more fragmented that before, welfare plu-
ralism continues to characterize the American approach to social
policy and despite the Reagan onslaught, the country remains
what Jansson (1988) and others have called as a 'reluctant wel-
fare state'.
On the other hand, the administration clearly introduced
significant and durable changes. Perhaps the most important of
these for social policy is the budget deficit which will effectively
preclude the generation of new revenues for social expenditures
in the immediate future. The successful facilitation of populist
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antitax sentiment through tax cuts, tax reform and skillful cani-
paigning, have reinforced popular antipathy to new revenues,
especially for the human services. Of equal importance is tihe ef-
fects the Reagan years have had on the Democratic party which
has failed to mount an effective counterattack. While the Reagan
administration did not succeed in bringing about a fundamen-
tal political realignment in electoral politics, it weakened the lib-
eral consensus. As Schneider (1988) observed, moderates within
both parties who previouly formed tie core of centrist liberal-
ism, have been swept to the side while those on the right now
appear to hold sway. The hardening of public opinion as well
the deliberate weakening of the trade unions has exacerbated
the problems facing the Democratic party and its traditional
allies. While welfarists within the .party search for ways of pre-
senting their ideals in ways thai are electorally realistic, many
have turned away from the party's historic commitment to wel-
fare. In this situation, it not clear who will effectively represent
the deprived, needy and powerless in American society.
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